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Creation or Evolution?
Hermeneutical Reflections on the Margin of the Creation Accounts
by Korinna Zamfir
This essay addresses the Christian roots of the antagonism posited between the the­
ory of evolution and biblical perspectives on creation. The opposition claimed by cer­
tain theologians has to do with hermeneutical options and theological views, such as 
the idea of full verbal inspiration and of the absolute inerrancy of the Bible. First, I 
briefly tackle with the attempts to solve or to supersede the conflict between the crea­
tion accounts and the theory of evolution. Second, I address some hermeneutical 
principles that should guide the interpretation of the creation accounts. After criticis­
ing the idea of full verbal inspiration I emphasise the importance of the historical 
critical approach. Subsequently, following Ricoeur, I argue that the interpretation of 
biblical texts should pay attention to the symbolic character of religious language.
The debate over the truth or fallacy of the theory of evolution is as heated today -  at least 
in certain contexts -  as it was at the end of the nineteenth century. Amazingly, after two 
centuries of critical biblical scholarship, the biblical creation accounts are still read as if 
they were contradicting natural scientific findings. The debate between religion and natu­
ral science is essentially related to the interpretation of the creation accounts; more pre­
cisely it is a consequence of fundamentalist biblical interpretation. The latter implies that 
the creation accounts should be regarded as the source of objective information on the 
origin of the universe and of life. This sort of biblical interpretation leads to the explicit 
rejection of scientific explanations, especially of the theory of evolution.1 Thus, from the 
Christian side at least, the antagonism between scientific and religious approaches is es­
sentially related to the view that the competence of Scriptures, generally of religion ex­
tends over the entire field of knowledge, scientific issues included. This position is defi­
nitely more common in conservative evangelical circles in the USA, but is far from being 
an exclusively American Protestant position.2
1 According to the 2004-Gallup polls 45 % of the population of the US thought that God created humans in their 
present form in the last 10.000 years (creationism); 38 % held that humans evolved from other living beings in a 
process guided by God, during several million years; 13 % adopted a similar evolutionary perspective, but ex­
cluded the role of God, and 4 % had no opinion on the matter (P. F. Lurquin; L. Stone, Evolution and Religious 
Creation Myth: How Scientists Respond, Oxford 2007, 3). The authors stressed the stability o f these results 
over several decades. In the 2007-Gallup polls 39 % held it certainly true, and 27 % probably true that God cre­
ated humans in the last 10.000 years (H. Hemminger, Die Geschichte des neuzeitlichen Kreationismus. Von 
«creation-science» zur Intelligent-Design-Bewegung, in: M. Neukamm, Evolution im Fadenkreuz des Kreatio­
nismus. Darwins religiöse Gegner und ihre Argumentation [Religion, Theologie und Naturwissenschaft 19], 
Göttingen 2009, 15-36 [19]).
2 On the European expansion of creationism: R. L  Numbers, The Creationists. From Scientific Creationism to 
Intelligent Design, Cambridge MA -  London, 2006, 399-416. In Romania, starting with the 2007/2008 aca­
demic year, evolutionary theory is no longer part of the high school biology curriculum (Ordinul ministrului
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Moreover, a number of scientists also claim that the scientific and the religious world­
views are mutually exclusive. Criticism issued by natural scientists results mainly from 
unawareness concerning the essentials of biblical scholarship, and thus from a naive in­
terpretation of the creation accounts,3 but is also a reaction to the untenable, pseudo­
scientific statements coming from the creationist camp. On a deeper level, however, its 
foundation is ideological naturalism, which principially excludes the possibility of ulti­
mate non-natural causality, and suggests that all aspects of the world and of human exis­
tence, up to the fundamental ground, may be explained in an exclusive and satisfactory 
manner by natural causes.4 Scientists embracing ideological naturalism defend evolution­
ary theory (that, no doubt, from a scientific perspective, is so far unrivalled) as a sort of 
ideology. Thus, the debate opposes in fact two ideological approaches.5
A further, deep-seated cause of this antagonism is the modem epistemological perspec­
tive that marks believers and atheists alike, and equates “truth” with natural scientific and 
historical “truth”. This epistemological monism indebted to rationalism compels Chris­
tian circles to defend the historical character of the creation accounts, and prevents cer­
tain scientists from accepting the possibility of ultimate religious interpretations of being. 
Yet the remarkable complexity of reality, as well as the multiple shifts in interpretative 
patterns occurring over time should prevent us from regarding any specific description of 
the world as solely valid. Epistemological prudence also cautions against taking ancient 
authors’ mythical-symbolical way of thinking as immediately accessible to 20lh-21st cen­
tury readers, without any contextual approach.
In this essay I address the Christian roots of the antagonism posited between evolution­
ary theory and biblical perspectives. I argue that this opposition has to do with herme­
neutical, theological options, and is related to the idea of full verbal inspiration and of the
educatiei §i cercetärii nr. 5959/22.12.2006, Anexa 2; Programa $colara Pentru Ciclul Superior al Liceului, 
Biologie, Clasa a XII-A1 Aprobat prin Ordinul ministrului nr. 5959/ 22.12.2006, http://www.edu.ro/index.php/ 
articles/8522). On the Romanian situation see also Numbers, Creationists, 412.
3 An April 2008-edition of the German TV program “Welt der Wunder” argued that science is incompatible 
with the Bible; the editors thought it frightening that 73 % of German respondents still believed in a Creator, 
and only 21 % in evolution. Creation and evolution were presented as alternative and mutually exclusive expla­
nations, and evolution as a matter of belief. Criticism of belief in creation was conspicuously based on a naive 
interpretation of the creation accounts and addressed creationist perspectives, which were undifferentiatedly 
presented as the Christian interpretation.
4 See e.g. R. Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker. Why the Evidence of Evolution Reveals a Universe without De­
sign, New York -  London 1986, republished 1996; id., The God Delusion, London 2006. On the phenomenon 
and on its criticism see also A. Kreiner, Ordnung -  Fingerabdruck Gottes oder blinder Zufall? paper given at 
Regensburg, 2005, October 26, Hung, translation: A rend -  Isten ujjlenyomata vagy a veletlen rnuve?, in: 
Merleg 1 (2006) 39-48 (40-41); id., Gott als Designer? Kreationismus, Intelligent Design und Darwinismus, in: 
G. Augustin; K. Krämer (eds.), Gott denken und bezeugen. FS Kardinal W. Kasper, Freiburg -  Basel -  Wien 
2008, 542-567 (565-566); H. Kessler, Kreative Schöpfung -  Kreativität Gottes. Überlegungen zum Spannungs­
feld von Schöpfung und Evolution, in: J. Klose; J. Oehler (eds.), Gott oder Darwin? Vernünftiges Reden über 
Schöpfung und Evolution, Heidelberg 2008, 27-57 (28-29); E. C. Scott, Antievolution and Creationism in the 
United States, in: Annual Review of Anthropology 26 (1997) 263-289 (272). Materialistic evolutionism goes 
beyond the competence of science when arguing that natural sciences may adequately explain the ultimate 
ground of all phenomena, excluding the possibility of ultimate transcendent causality, and regarding atheism as 
the necessary result o f evolutionary theory.
5 Kessler rightly remarks that both creationism and naturalism are closed dogmatic systems (Kreative Schöp­
fung, 29).
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absolute inerrancy of the Bible. My underlying hypothesis is that the creation accounts 
cannot be used as arguments against evolutionary theory, simply because they deal with 
other issues than natural science, they reflect a different perspective, and they address re­
ality in a totally different manner.6
First, I briefly tackle with the attempts to solve or to supersede the (highly artificial) 
conflict between the creation accounts and evolutionary theory. Second, I address the 
hermeneutical principles guiding the interpretation of the creation accounts. After criticis­
ing the idea of full verbal inspiration I emphasise the importance of the historical critical 
approach for understanding ancient texts and their intention; subsequently, following 
some of Ricceur’s hermeneutical principles, I argue that the interpretation of biblical texts 
should pay attention to the symbolic character of religious language.
1. Creation or Evolution?
Attempts to Solve the Dilemma or to Harmonise the Approaches
Downplaying Evolutionary' Theory: Evolution is “Just a Theory ”
Evolutionary theory is very commonly downplayed by claiming that it is “just” a theory. 
This position is generally related to the ideological criticism of evolutionary theory (as in 
creationism, or intelligent design). Allegedly evolution is not a verified fact, but “only a 
theory”, and can be therefore dismissed. A comparable position claims that evolutionary 
theory leaves many unanswered questions, therefore is not necessarily true.7 Here two 
points should be made.
First, while there is no consensus regarding the mechanisms of evolution, evolution as 
such is not a matter of debate within scientific circles. Yet, there is more to the matter. 
Scientific theory may not be opposed to reality/to facts, as the two concepts are not inter­
changeable. Theory is the organizing frame of observable facts, of phenomena, and in its 
absence “facts” are only the accumulation of unrelated observations. The observation of 
phenomena only makes sense within an explanatory theory. Further, theories lead to pre­
dictions or observations that may occasion the discovery of new facts.8 On the other hand 
a “fact” is not necessarily true, as it may also be the result of erroneous observations.
6 Chr. Aus der Air Wie Orgel und Staubsauger. Das Verhältnis zwischen Evolutionstheorie und Schöpfungs­
geschichte aus theologischer Sicht, in: Neukamm, Evolution, 341-350. Otherwise, the creation accounts do not 
exhaust all issues of a biblical theology of creation, since the matter is also addressed in prophetic and wisdom 
literature and in Psalms. Yet, these texts, their importance notwithstanding, are not part of the public common 
thought to the same extent as the creation accounts, and do not figure in the debate opposing science and reli­
gion.
7 Chr. Schönbom, The Reflections of Joseph Ratzinger Pope Benedict XVI on Evolution, in: W. Arber; 
N. Cabibbo; M. Sanchez Sorondo (eds.), Scientific Insights into the Evolution of the Universe and of Life. The 
Proceedings of the Plenary Session on Scientific Insights into the Evolution of the Universe and o f Life 31 Oc­
tober -  4 November 2008 (Pontificiae Academiae Scientiarum Acta 20), Vatican City 2009, 12-21; id., A 
teremtes hite es a fejlödeselmelet, in: Communio 1 (2004) 11-21 (15-16, 21).
8 Lurquin; Stone, Evolution, 7-9 , 29-30. See also N. Murphy, Phillip Johnson on Trial: A Critique of His Cri­
tique of Darwin, in: R. T. Pennock (ed.), Intelligent Design Creationism and Its Critics: Philosophical, Theo­
logical, and Scientific Perspectives, Cambridge MA -  London 2001,451-^-69.
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“Fact” is not identical with reality. A fact, beside being observable and reproducible, is 
meaningful and has explanatory value only if it can be integrated into a scientific theory. 
Theory and fact can therefore not be opposed, as they are not alternative concepts. As a 
result, it does not make sense to claim that evolutionary theory is “only a theory”, and not 
a “fact”. Scientific research involves experiment, observation and theories that explain 
facts.9
Creationism
The basic assumption of creationism is that the Bible is the revealed word of God without 
any further qualification, therefore it must be literally true.10 Creationism implies a num­
ber of theses, such as the immediate, special, ex nihilo creation of the universe and of life, 
the insufficiency of mutations and natural selection to explain the appearance of all spe­
cies of living beings out of a single precursor; the occurrence of changes exclusively 
within created kinds of plants and animals; the rejection of a common ancestor of humans 
and apes; a catastrophe theory including a worldwide flood that shaped the Earth; the 
(relatively) young age of the Earth and of the kinds of living beings (this last assumption 
needs further qualification).11 Due to the literal interpretation of the creation accounts, 
creationism rejects evolutionary theory, thought to be incompatible with the word of God.
(1) Young Earth creationism dates the origin of the universe to the last 10,000 years, 
based on the literal interpretation of the six-day creation account and of the narrative of 
the flood. In view of some other biblical passages (Ps 90,4; 2 Pet 3,8) the six days are 
taken for 6,000 years, i.e. six epochs of thousand years. A radical stream defends a 6x24 
hours creation.12 God is thought to have created the world, the kinds of living beings, as 
well as humans directly, pretty much in their present form (special creation).13 14The most 
radical groups defend a flat Earth-theory and geocentrism. Young Earth creationists take 
the stratification of fossils as markers of the flood(s). (2) Old Earth creationism14 accepts
9 “[A] theory can be defined as «organized knowledge applicable in a wide variety of circumstances devised to 
analyze and predict the nature of a specified set of phenomena (or facts)». Further, one can say that, in science, 
progress can be achieved only through the interplay of experimentation or observation (discovery of new facts) 
with theory (making sense of the new facts).” (Lurquin; Stone, Evolution, 8).
10 A distinction should be made here between what for instance Catholic exegesis calls the “literal sense” of the 
biblical text [sensus literal is], i.e. the meaning intended and expressed by the author, the primary sense of the 
text that requires historical critical interpretation, and “literal interpretation” proper to fundamentalist ap­
proaches, which implies that the meaning of biblical texts is immediately accessible to readers without further 
interpretation and reflection. This distinction should be bom in mind when I speak of the literal interpretation 
marking out creationism. On the sensus literalis: R. E. Brown; S. M. Schneiders, Hermeneutics, in: R. E. 
Brown; J. A. Fitzmyer; R. E. Murphy, The New Jerome Biblical Commentary [further on: NJBC], Englewood 
Cliffs NJ 1990, 1146-1165 (1148-1149).
11 On creationism Numbers, Creationists, esp. 268-372; Hemminger, Geschichte, 15-36; Scott, Antievolution, 
266-270; Kreiner, Gott, 543-552; A. E. McGrath, Darwinism, in: Ph. Clayton; Z. Simpson (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Religion and Science, Oxford 2006, 681-696 (692).
12 E.g. G. F. Hasel, The ‘Days’ of Creation in Gen 1: Literal ‘Days’ or Figurative ‘Periods/Epochs’ of Time?, 
in: Origins 21.1 (1994) 5-38.
13 For a criticism of special creation and of creationism see also: Van Till, When Faith and Reason Cooperate, 
148, 151.
14 Scott, Anti evolution, 269-271.
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that the Earth has a much higher age, possibly of billions of years, (a) “Gap theory” or 
“restitution theory” postulates a temporal gap between Gen 1,1 and 1,2:15 the first refers 
to the initial, preadamite creation, destroyed by God, followed by the recreation of the 
world and the creation of humans. This gap would explain the high age of the Earth, (b) 
The “day-age theory” takes the days for longer, undefined periods of several million 
years possibly corresponding to geological periods, (c) Progressive creationism accepts 
many results of modern physics and cosmology (some even the Big Bang theory), but 
limits the possibility of biological evolution to genetic variability within the created 
kinds, i.e. to the microevolutionary level, and rejects macroevolution. The stratification of 
fossils is due to the fact that God created kinds at different times.
Intelligent Design
“Intelligent design”, similarly to creationism, postulates that evolutionary theory is 
wrong. The main objection is that Darwinism is essentially atheistic. Contrary to crea­
tionism, the strategy of ID implies leaving aside biblical arguments16 and references to 
God. ID is presented by its proponents as a scientific theory, as the alternative of evolu­
tionary theory. Its premise is that the theory of evolution must be wrong, because the al­
leged “irreducible complexity” of living beings and organs may not be explained by haz­
ard, but requires an intelligent designer.17 This intelligent designer is not called God, to 
avoid the accusation of unscientific bias, yet extraterrestrial intelligence is hardly what 
proponents have in mind. The examples used to illustrate irreducible complexity (watch,
15 This theory is based on the supposition that Gen 1,2 would describe conditions that succeeded (after an inde­
terminate period), the original creation of a perfect universe. See V. P. Hamilton, The Book of Genesis. Chap­
ters 1-17 (The new international commentary on the Old Testament), Grand Rapids 1990, 115-116.
16 “In good time new theories will emerge, and science will change. We shouldn’t try to shortcut the process by 
establishing some new theory of origins until we know more about exactly what needs to be explained. Maybe 
there will be a new theory of evolution, but it is also possible that the basic concept will collapse and science 
will acknowledge that those elusive common ancestors of the major biological groups never existed. If we get 
an unbiased scientific process started, we can have confidence that it will bring us closer to the truth. For the 
present I recommend that we also put the Biblical issues to one side. The last thing we should want to do, or 
seem to want to do, is to threaten the freedom of scientific inc{uiry. Bringing the Bible anywhere near this issue 
just raises the «Inherit the Wind» stereotype, and closes minds instead of opening them. We can wait until we 
have a better scientific theory>, one genuinely based on unbiased empirical evidence and not on materialist phi­
losophy, before we need to worry about whether and to what extent that theory is consistent with the Bible. Un­
til we reach that better science, it’s just best to live with some uncertainties and incongruities, which is our lot as 
human beings -  in this life, anyway.” Ph. E. Johnson, How to Sink a Battleship: A Call to Separate Materialist 
Philosophy from Empirical Science, in: The Real Issue, November/December 1996, online: http://www.lead- 
eru.com/real/ri9602/johnson.html, quoted by B. Forrest, The Wedge at Work: How Intelligent Design Creation­
ism is Wedging Its Way into the Cultural and Academic Mainstream, in: Pennock, Intelligent Design, 5-53  (18; 
cf. 42-43, emphases KZ).
17 M. J. Behe, Molecular Machines: Experimental Support for the Design Inference, in: Pennock, Intelligent 
Design, 241-256 (originally in: Cosmic Pursuit 1.2 [1998] 27-35); Ph. E. Johnson, Creator or Blind Watch­
maker?, in: Pennock, Intelligent Design, 435-449 (orig. in: First Things 29 [1993] 8-14); W. A. Dembski, in De­
fence of Intelligent Design, in: Clayton; Simpson, Oxford Handbook, 715-731; W. B. Provine, Evolution, Re­
ligion, and Science, in: Clayton; Simpson, Oxford Handbook, 667-680. See also Kreiner, Gott, 552-565; Num­
bers, Creationists, 373-398; Lurquin; Stone, Evolution, 15-18, 68; McGrath, Darwinism, 81-696 (692-693); 
Scott, Antievolution, 279-285.
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bicycle, mouse trap, aircraft) are taken from the world of mechanical devices. ID admits 
variability within species, but rejects macroevolution. The origin of species is related to 
purposeful design, to the immediate and specific intervention of the intelligent designer. 
Although it is presented as a scientific theory, the argumentation of its proponents clearly 
shows that ID in fact turns religious convictions into an ideology.18
Critics articulate with good reason a number of objections.19 In spite of its self­
representation as scientific theory, and its refraining from biblical arguments, the “hy­
pothesis”, or the postulate of ID is that the intelligent designer intervenes directly in the 
world. Although concealed, this position is grounded in the literal interpretation of the 
Bible, which makes evolutionary theory principially unacceptable. Thereby ID is funda­
mentally different from scientific theories. Its hypothesis may not be verified (the exis­
tence of the intelligent designer may not be proved).20 ID-institutes and “researchers” 
carry out no research programmes, do not formulate scientific theories, and its proponents 
do not publish scholarly articles in peer-reviewed journals.21
The biological views defended are also problematic, since ID wrongly postulates the 
perfection of organisms, biological structures and physiological processes (the eye, the 
coagulation system, the flagellum), leaving aside the imperfections, the undesirable mani­
festations, or the existence of elements with no evident purpose; all these would suggest 
an incompetent designer.22 ID argues without ground that allegedly “irreducibly com­
plex” organs and metabolic chains could not have evolved from earlier, simpler forms.23 
Further, the mechanical devices used by ID-advocates for the purpose of analogy may not 
be compared to living beings, since these are not merely a summation of pre-existent 
components (although simpler components may exist), and certain simpler precursors 
may be found.
In its criticism of Darwinism, ID conflates methodological and ideological naturalism 
(materialistic evolutionism), and wrongly claims Darwinism to be necessarily atheistic. 
On this ground it postulates the incompatibility of religion and evolutionary theory;24
18 Johnson, Creator. 442-443 on creation and miracles. Yet, see B. Weissnmhr s criticism of the scholastic defi­
nition of miracles (Gottes Wirken in der Welt. Ein Diskussionsbeitrag zur Frage der Evolution und des 
Wunders, Frankfurt a.M. 1973; Filozöfiai es fundamentälis-teolögiai megfontoläsok a csoda problemäjähoz, in: 
B. Gy [ed.], Csoda-elbeszelesek. Szegedi Biblikus Konferencia 1998, Szeged 2000, 171-185).
19 For the criticism of ID: B. Forrest, The Wedge at Work: How Intelligent Design Creationism Is Wedging Its 
Way into the Cultural and Academic Mainstream, in: Pennock, Intelligent Design, 5-53; R. T. Pennock, The 
Pre-Modem Sins of Intelligent Design, in: Clayton; Simpson, Oxford Handbook, 732-748; for its scientific cri­
tique: Lurquin; Stone, Evolution, 58-62, 68-71; M. J. Brauer; D. R. Brumbaugh, Biology Remystified: The 
Scientific Claims of the New Creationists, in: Pennock, Intelligent Design, 289-334.
20 Lurquin; Stone, Evolution, 8-10.
21 Forrest. Wedge, 5-53.
22 Lurquin; Stone, Evolution, 75-79; Kessler, Kreative Schöpfung, 37.
23 K. R. Miller, The Flagellum Unspun. The Collapse of «Irreducible Complexity», in: W. A. Dembski; M. Ruse 
(eds.), Debating Design: From Darwin to DNA Black Box. The Biochemical Challenge to Evolution, Cam­
bridge 2004, 81-97.
24 Ph. E. Johnson, Evolution as Dogma: The Establishment of Naturalism, in: Pennock, Intelligent Design, 5 9 -  
76 (first published in: First Things 6 [1990] 15-22); Johnson, Creator, 438-442. Even A. Plantinga, When Faith 
and Reason Clash: Evolution and the Bible, in: Pennock, Intelligent Design, 113-145 (orig. in: Christian 
Scholar’s Review 21.1 [1991] 8-32), arguing that the theory of evolution is not religiously or theologically neu­
tral (122-123, 125-126). His examples are however ideological scientists like Dawkins, and fundamentalist
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moreover, it also rejects theistic evolutionism.25 ID is also problematic from a philosophi­
cal-theological perspective. Defending special creation, ID reduces God to one of the 
natural causes within the universe, and suspends divine transcendence.26 ID is an apolo­
getic-polemic programme, with an exceptionally combative strategy, eventually aimed at 
disseminating an ideology, and as such it is also part of a political struggle.27 To sum up, 
ID is eventually a version of creationism, and in no way a scientific theory.28
The Harmonisation of the Creation Accounts with Scientific Explanations
Harmonisation may occur either by the projection of scientific notions into the biblical 
texts, or by the teleological interpretation of the universe and of life.
The first approach implies searching in the biblical accounts elements that may appear 
to coincide with or to substantiate scientific theories. Thus the creation of light before 
that of the Sun is seen to coincide with the cosmic background radiation following the 
Big Bang. The sequentiality of creation, the sequence of the living beings, is seen to be 
pretty similar to that of evolution.29 The theory of the “mitochondrial Eve”30, and of the 
genetic (Y-chromosomal) Adam3'- may seem to support the monogenism grounded in the 
second creation account.32 Such harmonisations, often attempting to prove that the Bible
evangelicals, i.e. representatives of extreme positions. One wonders how relevant these examples are, when 
compared to the work of scientists and theologians who find no such conflict between evolutionary theory and 
faith. See Pennock, Naturalism; id., Pre-Modem Sins, 739: “Methodological naturalism does not claim access to 
all possible truths.”
25 ID present theistic evolutionism as a catastrophic accommodation to Darwinism, as an appearance of biblical 
interpretation, a false intellectual system that adopts symbolic, instead of literal interpretation (Johnson). Demb- 
ski is clear: “Design theorists are no friends of theistic evolution”, 1995, 3, cited by Pennock. Pre-Modem Sins, 
744.
26 Kreiner, Gott als Designer?, 563; Van Till, When Faith and Reason Cooperate, 158-159, 161; G. V. Coyne, 
Science Does Not Need God. Or Does It? A Catholic Scientist Looks at Evolution, Palm Beach Atlantic Uni­
versity in West Palm Beach, FL, (1/31/2006), http://www.catholic.org/national/nationaI_ story.php?id= 18504; 
Kessler, Kreative Schöpfung, 47; cf. Weissmahr, Fundamentális-teológiai és filozófiai megfontolások, 178-183. 
Pennock shows that any scientific research is based on the conscience of the stability of natural laws that would 
be obliterated by God’s occasional interventions (Naturalism, Evidence, and Creationism: The Case o f Phillip 
Johnson, in: id., Intelligent Design, 77-97 [88-90]; orig. in: Biology & Philosophy 11.4 [1996] 543-549).
27 Johnson asserted that 20th century Christianity adopted a defensive strategy; ID will go into the camp of the 
enemy and blow up its ammunition dump, i.e their version of creation. But see the criticism of H. J. Van Till, 
When Faith and Reason Cooperate, in: Pennock, Intelligent Design, 147-163 [147-148, 152] (orig. in: Christian 
Scholar’s Review 21.1 [1991] 33-45).
28 Kessler, Kreative Schöpfung, 28.
29 E.g. the introductory considerations of W. Arber (W. Arber; N. Cabibbo; M. Sánchez Sorondo (eds.). Scien­
tific Insights into the Evolution of the Universe and of Life. The Proceedings of the Plenary Session on Scien­
tific Insights into the Evolution of the Universe and of Life, 31 October -  4 November 2008 [Pontificiae Aca- 
demiae Scientiarum Acta 20], Vatican City 2009, LXVI).
30 Lurquin; Stone, Evolution, 92-93.
31 Lurquin; Stone, Evolution, 93-95; U. Liike, „Als Anfang schuf G ott...“ Bio-Theologie. Zeit -  Evolution -  
Hominisation, Paderborn -  München -  Wien -  Zürich 1997, 214-215.
32 On the difficulties of this harmonization: Liike, Zeit und Ewigkeit, 215. On the issues o f hominisation: 
Lurquin; Stone, Evolution, 85—105; Luke, 228-236.
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is nonetheless right, do not take into account the fact that biblical texts do not speak of 
the how of creation in a scientific sense.33
The second approach incorporates the concept of tuning and the anthropic principle. 
Natural constants in the universe appear to be tuned to such extent, that an alteration 
would have made the apparition of life impossible. This tuning, it is argued, may not be 
the result of hazard.34 To some it also seems that the universe is oriented toward the appa­
rition of humans/of intelligence (the anthropic principle).35 This view was challenged by 
the theories of multiverses or parallel universes, yet even these seem to be highly hypo­
thetical.36
While these approaches have much to commend them, there is no need to harmonise 
Scriptures with the Big Bang or with the theory of evolution, attempting to prove that the 
Bible already knows these concepts. It has to be recognised that the Bible speaks of 
something else, in a largely dissimilar cultural environment, within a different epistemo­
logical frame. Ancient authors have been thinking differently, have searched answer to 
other questions, and have expressed their thoughts in various genres, very dissimilar from 
contemporary scientific discourse. Theology may not sustain an indefensible literalism. 
Theology aims instead at developing an understanding of creation that is based on the one 
hand on the sensible interpretation of the biblical texts, and on the other is construed in 
dialogue with scientific research, integrating the concepts emerging from it. As Pannen- 
berg puts it: “A theological doctrine of creation should follow where the biblical witness 
leads by claiming current knowledge of the world for a description of the divine work of 
creation, using the resources that are actually at hand.”37
Theistic evolution
A theology that takes into account the results of scientific research, and reckons with a 
personal God who creates by making use of the autonomy and creative potential of crea­
tures is not a recent development. It suffices to recall the work of Teilhard de Chardin. In 
a more recent version, theistic evolution essentially argues that God’s creating activity is 
mediated by evolution.38 According to Howard J. Van Till, God creates a “fully gifted 
creation”, characterised by functional integrity, and enables it to develop. God does not
33 R. Mosis, Biblische Schöpfungsaussagen und heutiges Selbstverständnis des Menschen, in: K. Schmitz- 
Moormann (ed.), Schöpfung und Evolution. Neue Ansätze zum Dialog zwischen Naturwissenschaften und 
Theologie, Düsseldorf 1992, 58-75 (67).
34 Tuning is commonly linked to Freeman Dyson (Lurquin; Stone, Evolution, 12-13).
35 Liike, Zeit und Ewigkeit, 243-250 (the criticism from biology); E. P. Fischer, Evolution und Schöpfung -  
Was erklärt die Evolutionstheorie?, in: Gott oder Darwin?, 95-102 (101); Ph. Hefner, Religion-and-science, in: 
Clayton; Simpson, Oxford Handbook, 562-576 (570); Kessler, Kreative Schöpfung, 48-49.
36 Lurquin; Stone, Evolution, 13—14 (cf. V. J. Stenger, The Unconscious Quantum: Metaphysics in Modem  
Physics and Cosmology, Amherst NY 1995). For a critique: Kessler, Kreative Schöpfung, 48-49.
37 W. Pannenberg, Systematic Theology 2, tr. G. W. Bromiley, Grand Rapids MI -  Edinburgh 1994, 117, com­
pare 119 on the possibility of integrating evolution as a view that sustains God’s ongoing creating activity.
38 Scott, Antievolution, 271-272; cf. McGrath, Darwinism, 693 (evolutionary theism).
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need therefore to intervene every now and then, in a miraculous manner.39 The activity of 
the world is largely autonomous. There are no gaps in the functioning of the world that 
would compel God to step in and to take over thereby the role of the creatures.40 This per­
spective may be connected to the doctrine of creatio continua: God creates in a mediated 
manner, continuously, gradually, through the development of the aptitudes of the world.41
These endeavours are highly creditable for theologians open to the dialogue with sci­
ence (and hopefully for scientists, as well). Yet, I shall not discuss them in more detail, as 
they pertain to the field of systematic theology, and my main interest here concerns the 
hermeneutics of biblical texts, more specifically of the creation accounts. It is not my in­
tention to propose a detailed discussion of the question of inspiration, or to assess the 
various models of biblical hermeneutics. I only wish to show how the understanding of 
inspiration determines the way in which the biblical texts on creation are read.
2. Hermeneutical Reflections on the Creation Accounts
Preliminary Considerations
As shown earlier, critics of the theory of evolution claim that scientific explanations re­
garding the origins of life, especially of humans, are incompatible with the statements 
made in the Bible about the immediate, purposeful creation of the world. This view is 
grounded in fundamentalist biblical understanding, intimately connected with a particular 
interpretation of the authority of the Bible: the Bible is without any further specification 
the revealed word of God, and as such it is entirely free of error, and right in all its state­
ments (this explains why the most virulent attacks on evolutionary theory come from the 
fundamentalist evangelical circles in the US42). Because the Bible is without any further 
qualification the word of God, it may not be interpreted otherwise as literally.43 Such un­
derstanding of the inerrancy and of the absolute authority of the Bible comes partly from 
a certain interpretation of inspiration; on the other hand -  within Protestant circles -  it is 
connected to the principle of the sola Scriptura. Ultimately, therefore, the debate is re­
lated to certain hermeneutical options. Second, the discussion has an epistemological as­
pect as well, as it expresses one specific choice in comprehending and describing reality.
39 H. J. Van Till, The Fully Gifted Creation, in: J. P. Moreland; J. M. Reynolds (eds.), Three Views on Creation 
and Evolution, Grand Rapids MI 1999, 161-247; id., The Creation: Intelligently Designed or Optimally 
Equipped?, in: Pennock, Intelligent Design, 487-512 (orig. in: Theology Today 55.3 [1998] 344-364).
40 Van Till, When Faith and Reason Cooperate, 158.
41 Kessler, Kreative Schöpfung, 46: evolutionary theory and creatio continua are two representations o f the 
same reality. On the encounter between scientific and theological approaches: A. Peacocke, Science and God 
the Creator, in: Zygon 28.4 (1993) 469-484.
42 McGrath, Darwinism, 691; Kessler, Kreative Schöpfung, 28. A. Mazur, Believers and Disbelievers in Evolu­
tion, in: Politics and the Life Sciences 23.2 (2004) 55-61, shows a positive correlation between disbelief in evo­
lution and fundamentalist religiosity.
43 For a criticism of literal interpretation see e.g. Me Mullin, Plantinga’s Defense of Special Creation, 171, 173— 
175.
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The absolute inerrancy of the Bible is interrelated with its full, literal inspiration. The 
roots of this view go back to the model of inspiration understood as dictation, an idea that 
appears already in some patristic authors and becomes dominant in the late middle ages 
up to the modem period. It is defended by Catholic and Protestant authors, Catholic ec- 
clesial documents and Protestant confessional writings alike.44
This is the position of the Council of Trent and of Vatican I.45 The Providentissimus Deus (1893)46 of Leo XUL 
reflects the new situation marked by the emergence of the historical critical method, and for that reason it ex­
presses a rather apologetic position. While it strongly defends the full inspiration and inerrancy of the Bible, it 
also states that “those facts of natural science which investigators affirm to be now quite certain are not contrary 
to the Scripture rightly explained”; it goes on nonetheless expressing scepticism about the reliability o f scien­
tifically proved facts (“much which has been held and proved as certain has afterwards been called in question 
and rejected”).47 The polemic against historical criticism explains why at the beginning of the 20* century the 
Pontificia Commissio Biblica strongly defends the historical character of Gen 1-3 (including such naive views 
like the creation of woman from man), but interestingly does not extend historicity to all details, e.g. to the literal 
interpretation o f the days o f creation.48 With Divino afflante Spiritu (1943)49 comes the official recognition of  
the historical critical method; while defending scriptural inerrancy, it assigns great significance to the authorial 
intention, to the question of literary genres, and to the historical and cultural context of the biblical books. The 
encyclical operates with a slightly modified model of inspiration, as it lays greater emphasis on the role and 
abilities o f human authors. This view encourages the critical approach of biblical texts. The importance assigned 
to human authors, to authorial intention, to literary genres and to the circumstances that influenced the formation 
of the text is even more marked in the Dei Verbum (1965).50
In the Catholic Church a hermeneutical shift occurs with the Divino afflante Spiritu and 
especially with the Dei Verbum, in what concerns the understanding of inspiration, of di­
vine and human authorship and its influence on interpretation. This is one of the reasons 
explaining why some of the mid-20th century Catholic church-declarations show certain 
openness toward reconciling evolutionary theory and biblical accounts.51
The conservative evangelical position is greatly influenced by the strict understanding 
of scriptural inerrancy and of its exclusive authority.52 This certainly does not mean that
44 On the models of inspiration: R.F. Collins, Inspiration, in: NJBC, 1023-1033. See also N. T. Wright, The Last 
Word. Beyond the Bible Wars to a New Understanding of the Authority of Scripture, San Francisco 2005.
45 H. Denzinger, Kompendium der Glaubensbekenntnisse und kirchlichen Lehrentscheidungen, ed. P. Hüner- 
mann, Freiburg i.Br. 432010 (= DH), 1501 and 3006.
46 AAS 26 (1893-1894) 279-291; Engl, http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_l- 
xiii_enc_l 8111893_providentissimus-deus_en.html; excerpts in DH 3280-3294.
47 Providentissimus Deus 18. While refraining from saying that the Bible may err in scientific matters, it fol­
lows Augustin in saying that the Holy Spirit does not teach us about the nature of things, as such knowledge 
does not serve salvation.
48 Pontificia Commissione Biblica, Sul carattere storico dei primi tre capitoli della Genesi (1909), 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/pcb_documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19090630_genesi_ 
it.html.
49 AAS 35 (1943) 309-319; Engl, http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xii/encyclicals/documents/hf_p- 
xii_enc_30091943_divino-afflante-spiritu_en.html; excerpts: DH 3825-3831.
50 Dei Verbum 11-12.
51 Humani generis 36 (at least concerning the material aspect of hominisation, since it defends the direct crea­
tion of the soul; further, it rejects polygenism 37); Pope John Paul //, Message to the Pontifical Academy of 
Sciences: On Evolution (1996.10.22); http://www.ewtn.com/library/papaldoc/jp961022.htm.
52 For an overview of the various trends of evangelical biblical interpretation, on inspiration, literalism, and in- 
errantism: H. A. Harris, Fundamentalism and Evangelicals (Oxford Theological Monographs), Oxford 1998,
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literalism is a necessary consequence of Protestant biblical interpretation. Major Protes­
tant scholars have developed sensible hermeneutical approaches that do not promote a na­
ive interpretation of inspiration.53 The ecstatic model of inspiration, proposed by Tillich, 
an approach that does not exclude reason,54 as well as his emphasis on the organic unity 
between word and event in revelation55 disallow the quasi-magical interpretation of the 
written word and the unequivocal identification of revelation with the word of the Bible.56 
Protestant hermeneutics also apply the principles of divine accommodation and of pro­
gressive revelation which allow dispensing with literal interpretation, placing biblical 
statements in their historical and cultural context, and forbid reading the Bible as a source 
of scientific information proper.57 Revelation does not obliterate reason and scientific re­
search, argues Tillich.58 591 do not claim therefore that fundamentalism is a mark of Protes­
tant hermeneutics; such a view would be utterly mistaken. I merely wish to point here to 
the relationship between the strict interpretation of inerrancy, the principle of sola Scrip- 
turn, literal interpretation and the rejection of evolutionary theory. The position defended 
by a well-known scholar like Alvin Plantinga may be relevant. Plantinga explicitly ex­
plains the possible antagonism between faith and reason with the principles of inerrancy 
and of sola Scriptural Because of its almost absolute authority, the competence of the 
Bible logically extends, in his view, to every domain of cognition, a conclusion appar­
ently sustained by the fact that it also narrates historical events. Therefore, Plantinga ar­
esp. 63-66; 135-179, 181-190. See also E. Barker, Does it Matter How We Got Here? Dangers Perceived in 
Literalism and Evolutionism, in: Zygon 22.2 (1987) 213-225 (216-217).
53 P. Tillich, Systematic Theology I, Chicago 1973, 106-162; Ricoeur’s oeuvre in the field of biblical hermeneu­
tics is outstanding. See e.g. P. Ricceur, Toward a Hermeneutic of the Idea of Revelation, in: L. S. Mudge (ed.). 
Essays on Biblical Interpretation, Philadelphia 1980, 73-118; P. Ricceur; A. LaCocque, Penser la Bible, Paris 
1998, and the works referred to in section 2.4.
54 Tillich, Systematic Theology I, 112-115, 117-118, 158.
55 Tillich, Systematic Theology I, 125-126.
56 Tillich, Systematic Theology I, 114, 158; criticising the idea of dictation.
57 D. C. Harlow, Creation According to Genesis: Literary Genre, Cultural Context, Theological Truth, in: Chris­
tian Scholar’s Review 37.2 (2008) 163-198; D. O. Lamoureux, Lessons from the Heavens: On Scripture, Sci­
ence and Inerrancy, in: Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith 60.1 (2008) 4-15 . Van Till, When Faith and 
Reason Cooperate, 151-153: the authors could not have been acquainted with concepts like galactic redshift, 
thermonuclear fusion, plate tectonics, spacetime metrics, radiometric dating, stellar evolution, chemical reac­
tion, atomic spectra, DNA, genetic drift, molecular clock, micro-/macroevolution and alike. One may therefore 
not expect from the Bible statements that would help assessing scientific theories. Similarly, Harlow refers to 
the concepts of divine accommodation and progressive revelation, and defends the need to understand the his­
torical and religious background of biblical texts, the issue of literary genres, and the significance of a changed 
cultural context for interpretation (Creation, 167-168, 196).
58 Tillich, Systematic Theology 1, 117—118.
59 “Now we Reformed Christians are wholly in earnest about the Bible. We are people of the Word; Sola Scrip- 
tura is our cry; we take Scripture to be a special revelation from God himself, demanding our absolute trust and 
allegiance.” (When Faith and Reason Clash, 113; the author continues emphasizing that Protestantism also as­
signs major importance to reason, but his further argument clearly shows that he thinks that the Bible may be 
competent in scientific issues as well). Cf. 119: “Scripture is inerrant: the Lord makes no mistakes; what he pro­
poses for our belief is what we ought to believe.” His sole concession is that our understanding of what the Bi­
ble teaches may not correspond to its true message. While such views are more common in evangelical circles, 
a fundamentalist interpretation of inerrancy may be encountered in Orthodox and Catholic circles as well.
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gues, God may wish to communicate through the Bible scientific knowledge, as well.60 
Plantinga makes no reference to the results of critical biblical scholarship.61 His perspec­
tive leads to the conclusion that there may well be an antagonism between the assertions 
of the Bible and faith holding to them, on the one hand, and the statements made by sci­
ence and reason acknowledging them, on the other.62 Plantinga further argues that the in­
terpretation of biblical texts should focus on the intention of the divine, and not of the 
human author.63 A laudable aspiration, indeed, which can nonetheless hardly be attained 
by dismissing the human author.
To sum up, rather simplistically, the relationship between revelation, inspiration and 
the interpretation of Scriptures, two positions may be distinguished: according to the one, 
the Bible is the word of God, according to the other it is a witness to the word of God.64 
In a similarly simplistic manner, the first approach is adopted by conservative, more often 
evangelical, circles65 that assign an exclusive authority to the Bible. To the extent to 
which the Bible is without any further qualification the word of God, it must be literally 
true, even when literalist interpretation goes against scientific (rational) evidence. If, con­
versely, the Bible comprises the testimony of human authors to what they understood to 
be the word of God, which they expressed according to their cultural horizon, responding 
to the questions of their time, engaging in polemics against the currents and views of their
60 “[...] a sensible person might be convinced, after careful and prayerful study of the Scriptures, that what the 
Lord teaches there implies that this evidence [the scientific evidence for the old age of the Earth, K.Z.] is mis­
leading and that as a matter of fact the earth really is very young. So far as I can see, there is nothing to rule this 
out as automatically pathological or irrational or irresponsible or stupid. [...] this sort of view can be developed 
in more subtle and nuanced detail. For example, the above teachings may be graded with respect to the prob­
ability that they really are what the Lord intends us to learn from early Genesis. Most clear, perhaps, is that God 
created the world, so that it and everything in it depends upon him and neither it nor anything in it has existed 
for an infinite stretch of time. Next clearest, perhaps, is that there was an original human pair who sinned and 
through whose sinning disaster befell both man and nature [...]. That humankind was separately created is per­
haps less clearly taught; that many other kinds of living beings were separately created might be still less clearly 
taught; that the earth is young, still less clearly taught. [...]. I do not mean to endorse the view that all of these 
propositions are true: but it isn’t just silly or irrational to do so” (Plantinga, When Faith, 121-122). For the 
criticism of Plantinga: Van Till, When Faith and Reason Cooperate, 147-163; E. Me Mullin, Plantinga’s De­
fense of Special Creation, in: Pennock, Intelligent Design, 165-196 (Christian Scholar’s Review 21.1 [1991] 
55-70); id., Evolution and Special Creation, in: Zygon 28.3 (1993) 299-355.
61 Plantinga, When Faith, 113 (“Taken at face value, the Bible seems to teach that God created the world rela­
tively recently, that he created life by way of several separate acts of creation, that in another separate act o f  
creation, he created an original human pair, Adam and Eve, and that these our original parents disobeyed God, 
thereby bringing ruinous calamity on themselves, their posterity and the rest of creation”); cf. 121-122. Van Till 
notes that Plantinga eschews biblical scholarship and the critical reading of the Bible, creation accounts in­
cluded, relying on a naive exegesis (When Faith and Reason Cooperate, 149-150).
62 Plantinga, When Faith, 123-124. On this ground he argues for the higher probability of special creation 
compared to evolution (130-131). Against such conclusion see Van Till, When Faith and Reason Cooperate, 
147-148, 152 (criticising Plantinga’s discussion of evolution within the historical faith-versus-reason tension).
63 A. Plantinga, Evolution, Neutrality, and Antecedent Probability: A Reply to McMullin and Van Till, in: Pen­
nock, Intelligent Design, 197-236 (214, though rejecting the crude concept of dictation).
64 Collins, Inspiration, 43.
65 An example of Catholic fundamentalism is recorded by N. P. G. Austriaco, Reading Genesis with Cardinal 
Ratzinger, in: Homiletic & Pastoral Review (2003) 1-6, referring to V. Warkulwiz, who argued that the Catho­
lic Church should return to the traditional Catholic interpretation of origins, based on the literal meaning of 
Gen 1-11.
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age, the theological message of the text (“the word of God”) may not be thought to be 
immediately and directly available, without further reflection.66 In this case one needs to 
take into account the human element: human creativity, as well as the limits of scientific 
and social perspectives, of human cognition.
The Epistemological Aspects of Describing Reality
The absolute inerrancy of the Bible and its assumed authority over every field of know­
ledge is a view reflecting a sort of epistemological monism. The entire world may be ap­
propriately known by means of a single source, in this case the Bible (religion), provided 
its assertions are correctly understood; thus information drawn from the Bible may allow 
criticising scientific knowledge. The rejection of the religious interpretations by some 
scientists, because of their alleged incompatibility with scientific knowledge, reflects the 
other side of epistemological monism, as it takes science as the sole and sufficient dis­
course to adequately describe reality. Yet, reality is far more complex, and requires mul­
tiple perspectives, coming from various disciplines.67
It is a commonplace that natural sciences tackle with the laws governing the universe, 
with natural causality, whereas philosophy, and in a different manner, theology, inquire 
about the ultimate ground and cause of reality, about the existential aspects of life.68 The 
latter questions go beyond those asked by natural science and beyond its competence. 
The alleged antagonism between creation and evolutionary theory implies that theologi­
cal interpretation (creation), and scientific explanations (Big Bang, theory of evolution) 
are alternative responses to the same question.69 Yet, religion points in fact to a radically 
different dimension of the existence.70 As long as the specificity of each field is taken into 
account, and critical thinking is not given up, there can be no real antagonism between 
the scientific and the religious/theological approach.
66 H. Haag, Die biblische Schöpfungsgeschichte heute, in: H. Haag; A. Haas; J. Hiirzeler (eds.), Evolution und 
Bibel, Luzern -  München 1962, 7-56 (14: the Bible is not only the word of God, but the word of God through 
humans, to humans).
67 Kessler, Kreative Schöpfung, 34-36; Harlow, Creation, 166.
68 Kessler, Kreative Schöpfung, 36-37 (“Naturwissenschaft untersucht regelhafte [=gesetzmäßige] Funktions­
zusammenhänge zwischen endlichen Ursachen; sie fasst das expandierende Universum als lückenlosen Kausal­
zusammenhang auf und sie bedarf zu dessen Beschreibung keines Schöpfergottes. Aber naturwissenschaftliche 
Wie-Beschreibung und Kausal-Erklärung der Dinge und des Kosmos im Ganzen ist keine vollständige Er­
klärung, sondern nur ein möglicher Zugang zur Wirklichkeit unter anderen. [...] Die Physik als solche und 
Naturwissenschaft insgesamt blendet Zwecksetzen und Sinnverstehen aus. Einen Sinn der Welt kann sie weder 
finden noch leugnen. Letzte menschliche Fragen nach dem Warum und Wozu der Welt, nach Geist, Freiheit 
oder Gott vermag die Naturwissenschaft nicht zu beantworten. Naturwissenschaft muss Gott aus dem Spiel 
lassen, die Freiheit und einen Sinn auch. [...] Der Mensch aber [auch der Physiker oder der Himforscher als 
Mensch] fragt nach dem Sinn des Ganzen: dem Sinn des Lebens, der Geschichte, der ganzen Welt-Einrichtung. 
Der Mensch sucht sich und die Welt zu verstehen”). On philosophy and theology: Kessler, Kreative Schöpfung, 
38-39.
69 Van Till, 155 (“the common error of treating creation and evolution as if they were in essence alternative an­
swers to the same question”). Cf. Me Mullin, Plantinga’s Defense o f Special Creation, 175.
70 Kessler, Kreative Schöpfung, 39.
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Respect for the distinctive competency of various disciplines implies the recognition of 
specific methodologies. Biblical hermeneutics aims at establishing the principles to be 
followed in the interpretation of biblical texts. The matter is not simple, however. The 
shift that occurred roughly in the second half of the 20th century leads to the gradual de­
crease of the influence previously exerted by historical criticism, at the advantage of syn­
chronic (linguistic, literary, rhetorical) approaches and of theological interpretations (ca­
nonical criticism). Whereas historical criticism focuses on the formation of the text, on its 
cultural background and on the authorial intention, synchronic, literary approaches dimiss 
the issue of authorial intention as both inaccessible and irrelevant and focus on the (pluri- 
form) meaning of the text as it is, on the interplay of text and reader, and on the latter’s 
subjectivity.71 Theological approaches (e.g. canonical criticism), concentrate on the final, 
canonical form of the Bible as inspired text, and on its theological consequences for sys­
tematic theology and church practice.72 Not few biblical scholars think that historical 
criticism, especially with its focus on authorial intention, is outdated. This perspective 
has adepts among philosophically minded scholars as well. Thus Ricoeur, following 
Gadamer, argued for the emancipation of the written text and its autonomy with respect 
to authorial intention and to the world of the author.73 The autonomy of the written text 
removes the reader from the finite horizon of the original audience. Yet, Ricoeur does not 
posit the alternative “authorial intention versus text structure”, but focuses on the world 
of the text as object of biblical hermeneutics, i.e. on the world revealed by the text.74
In spite of the belittlement of historical critical interpretation, the method continues to 
be the ground for any serious biblical scholarship. No doubt, it is far from easy to dis­
cover the intention of the author; it is also true that any text has occasioned multiple in­
terpretations over the time (Wirkungsgeschichte), and interpretation is eventually (also) a 
dialogue between text and reader (reader-response criticism). Synchronic-literary and 
theological approaches offer an excellent complement and many valuable insights. Bibli­
cal theological reflection may not be absent from systematic theology. Yet, a solid exege­
sis needs to take into account the historical character of the text, the age and circum­
stances of its writing, its original readership, and the message the author intends to con­
vey.75 A major difficulty of any reading focusing exclusively on the subjectivity of the 
(atemporal or always different) reader is that in the end one can read anything from or
71 On the 20th century hermeneutical shift: Brown; Schneiders, Hermeneutics, 1146-1165; J. J. Collins, The B i­
ble after Babel: Historical Criticism in a Postmodern Age, Grand Rapids MI 2005 (esp. 1-25). For a criticism, 
see also G. R. Osborne, The Hermeneutical Spiral: A Comprehensive Introduction to Biblical Interpretation, 
Downers Grove 1997, 518-519.
72 B. S. Childs, Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments: Theological Reflection on the Christian Bi­
ble, Minneapolis MN 21993, 70-79; M. C. Calloway, Canonical Criticism, in: S. R. Haynes; St. L. McKenzie 
(eds.), To Each its Own Meaning: An Introduction to Biblical Criticisms and Their Applications, Louisville 
KY -  London -  Leiden -  Westminster21999, 142-155.
73 Ricoeur, Toward a Hermeneutic of the Idea of Revelation, in: id., Essays on Biblical Interpretation, ed. 
L. S. Mudge, Philadelphia 1980, 47-77 (64).
74 Ricoeur, Hermeneutic, 64-65.
75 P. L. A. Schokel; J. M. Bravo, A Manual of Hermeneutics (The Biblical Seminar 54), tr. L. M. Rosa, Shef­
field 1998, 32-47.
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into a text. On the other hand, a misconceived identification of the biblical text with the 
very word of God may read into the Bible issues that could not have been addressed by 
biblical authors.
From the viewpoint of our topic it is emphatically important to take into account pre­
cisely the criteria provided by historical criticism: the historical background of the text, 
the literary genre, the ‘Sitz im Leben’, the cultural context and the intention of the au­
thor.76 The misunderstanding of the creation accounts has to do precisely with the neglect 
of these issues, and with projecting modern assumptions into the text.77
Discovering the Symbolic Character of Religious Texts, as Hermeneutical Principle
Beyond methodological problems, the interpretation of the biblical texts has to take into 
account a more fundamental issue, namely the nature and character of religious discourse. 
The conflict between the scientific and the theological talk on origins shows that the reli­
gious and the scientific discourse are read alike, as source of objective-factual informa­
tion. In contrast, following Ricœur, I argue that the language of biblical texts is essen­
tially (real)symbolic, metaphoric, and addresses a deeper reality.
Ricœur emphasises the symbolic character of religious language.78 In his understand­
ing, the symbol is a linguistic expression with double (or multiple) meanings, that re­
quires interpretation.79 Interpretation is therefore aimed at revealing, deciphering the 
symbols; a symbol exists where an expression requires interpretation because of its dou­
ble or multiple meanings.80 Following Aristotle Ricœur shows that in every mythos there 
is a logos to be revealed.81 A symbol is an intentional structure constituted not in the rela­
tion between meaning and thing, but in the relation between the two meanings; this rela­
tionship is built on analogy, or the primary meaning reveals the second one.82 As opposed 
to the likeness, which we examine from outside, “a symbol is the very movement of the 
primary meaning intentionally assimilating us to the symbolized, without our being able 
to intellectually dominate the likeness”.83
In the field of phenomenology of religion this double meaning is expressed in the cos­
mic symbols (such as the earth, heavens, the water, the tree, the stone), and in the myths 
of origins.84 The mythos is not a naïve story, but, originally, a traditional narrative that 
has to do with the beginning of time, that grounds the rituals, generally those actions and 
ways of thinking through which humans understand themselves and their relationship to
76 Me Mullin, Plantinga’s Defense of Special Creation, 175.
77 Kessler, Kreative Schöpfung, 30.
78 Ricœur, Freud and Philosophy, New Haven 1970, 7-19; La Symbolique du Mal, Paris 1960, 16. On Ricœur’s 
hermeneutical principles see also: Ricœur, The Hermeneutics of Symbols and Philosophical Reflection I, tr. D. 
Savage, in: id., Conflict of Interpretations. Essays in Hermeneutics, ed. D. Ihde, London 2004, 284-311, esp. 
294-296.
79 Ricœur. Freud and Philosophy, 9, 18.
80 Ricœur, Freud and Philosophy, 9, 18, 38.
81 Ricœur, Freud and Philosophy, 19; cf. Ricœur, La Symbolique du Mal, 154.
82 Ricœur, Freud and Philosophy, 18.
83 Ricœur, Freud and Philosophy, 17.
84 Ricœur, La Symbolique du Mal, 18.
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reality. At the encounter with modern, rational thinking, myths loose their explanatory 
power, but turn into symbols, and acquire thereby the power to reveal the relationship 
with the Sacred.85 Symbols express in a powerful manner a deeper reality, which they 
both conceal and reveal.86
Ricoeur’s approach is conspicuously real-symbolic. The connection between signifier 
(“expression signifiante”) and signified (“le signifié”) is “a primordial, unfailing relation­
ship, which never has the conventional and arbitrary character of «technical» signs that 
mean only what is posited in them”.87 The symbol presupposes a double bond between 
signifier and signified, in our case the Sacred. The latter is bound to the primary, literal 
sense, and this explains the opacity of the symbol. On the other hand the literal sense is 
bound by the symbolic meaning that inhabits it: this explains the revealing power of 
symbols.88 It is precisely this revealing power that distinguishes symbols from merely in­
forming signs (which Ricceur calls “technical signs”): the symbol gives what it signi­
fies.89 90
For Ricœur hermeneutics has to do with recognising the symbolic nature of (religious) 
language. Hermeneutics, as interpretation, involves both faith and reason. Hermeneutics 
leading to faith necessarily implies an initial confrontation with suspicion. Faith is not the 
naïve faith of the simple soul, but the one that has gone through critical reflection; for 
that reason Ricceur speaks of a postcritical faith, which reaches through the process of in­
terpretation a “second naïveté”:
The contrary o f  suspicion, I will say bluntly, is faith. What faith? No longer, to be sure, the first 
faith o f the simple soul, but rather the second faith o f one who has engaged in hermeneutics, faith 
that has undergone criticism, postcritical faith. Let us look for it in the series o f philosophic deci­
sions that secretly animate a phenomenology o f religion and lie hidden even within its apparent 
neutrality. It is a rational faith, for it interprets; but it is a faith because it seeks, through interpreta­
tion, a second naïveté. Phenomenology is its instrument o f hearing, o f recollection, o f restoration 
of meaning. “Believe in order to understand, understand in order to believe” -  such is its maxim; 
and its maxim is the “hermeneutic circle” itself o f believing and understanding.^)
Interpreting the symbolic religious language that passes through deconstruction, one 
reaches the restoration of the deeper meaning of the text. This progress leads from cri-
85 Ricceur, La Symbolique du Mal, 12-13, 157.
86 Ricceur, Freud and Philosophy, 7.
87 Ricceur, La Symbolique du Mal, 22; Freud and Philosophy, 30—31; see also 48—51 on the artificial character 
of “logical symbols”. In this real-symbolic approach he comes close to 20th century Catholic real-symbolic the­
ology, represented e.g. by K. Rahner (Zur Theologie des Symbols, in: id., Schriften zur Theologie IV, Ein­
siedeln -  Zürich -  Köln 41964, 275-31 1).
88 Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 31.
89 “The revealing power of symbols opposes symbols to technical signs, which merely signify what is posited in 
them and which, therefore, can be emptied, formalized, and reduced to mere objects of a calculus. Symbols 
alone give what they say.” Ricceur, Freud and Philosophy, 31 (emphasis in the original).
90 Ricceur, Freud and Philosophy, 28, compare 543. The background of this statement is the criticism of those 
he calls the “masters of suspicion” -  Marx, Nietzsche and Freud and their hermeneutic of suspicion and critique 
of false consciousness. Yet their destructive criticism based on suspicion enables hermeneutics, as a process of  
interpretation. The hermeneutic of suspicion has also a positive element as it is aimed at a new form of con­
sciousness (Freud and Philosophy, 32-36).
tique to the second naïveté that grasps by means of critical reflection the sense of sym­
bolic language.91
Based on the hermeneutical principles elaborated by Ricceur, psychologists of religion 
David Wulff92 and Dirk Hutsebaut93 have developed scales to evaluate attitudes to relig­
ion from the viewpoint of the acceptance or rejection of the transcendent and of the criti­
cal or uncritical understanding of religious speech. The post-critical belief scale of Hut­
sebaut distinguishes four attitudes: (1) literal affirmation corresponding to orthodoxy 
(fundamentalism)94 (2) literal disaffirmation or external critique (3) reductive interpreta­
tion or relativism, and (4) restorative interpretation, or second naïveté.95 In terms of in- 
clusion/exclusion of the transcendent, orthodoxy and second naïveté, both inclusive, are 
at the opposite pole compared to external critique and reductive interpretation, exclusive 
of this dimension. Yet, orthodoxy and external critique are related in terms of literal in­
terpretation, the first representing literal affirmation, the second literal disaffirmation. Re­
storative interpretation (second naïveté) adopts a symbolic interpretation and integrates 
transcendence, while reductive interpretation explains religious phenomena by non- 
religious factors and rejects the transcendent dimension. For the latter, “If anything is 
considered to be absolute in this approach, it is the scientific method and rational and 
formal principles of knowledge”.96 While these scales pertain to the field of practical the­
ology, the categories on which they are based are useful for biblical hermeneutics. They 
show that the interpretation of religious statements largely depends on the literal or sym­
bolic reading of texts. The very notion of a symbolic meaning and reading of the biblical 
text may alarm conservative biblical scholars, as an assault to the authority of the Bible. 
However, such assumption reveals an exceeding reliance on historical meaning as the
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91 “You must understand in order to believe, but you must believe in order to understand. [...] You must believe 
in order to understand. No interpreter in fact will ever come close to what his text says if he does not live in the 
aura of the meaning that is sought. And yet it is only by understanding that we can believe. The second immedi­
acy, the second naïveté that we are after, is accessible only in hermeneutics: we can believe only by interpret­
ing. This is the ‘modern’ modality of belief in symbols; expression of modernity’s distress and cure for this dis­
tress. Such is the circle: hermeneutics proceeds from the preunderstanding of the very matter which through in­
terpretation it is trying to understand. But thanks to this hermeneutic circle I can still today communicate with 
the Sacred by explicating the preunderstanding which animates the interpretation. Hermeneutics, child o f ‘mo­
dernity’, is one of the ways in which this modernity overcomes its own forgetfulness of the Sacred. I believe 
that being can still speak to me, no longer indeed in the precritical form of immediate belief but as the second 
immediacy that hermeneutics aims at.” (Ricceur, The Hermeneutics of Symbols, 294-295).
92 D. Wulff, Psychology of Religion, Classic and Contemporary Views, New York 1991, esp. 630-635.
93 D. Hutsebaut, Post-Critical Belief. A New Approach to the Religious Attitude Problem, in: Journal o f Em­
pirical Theology 9.2 (1996) 48-66; B. Duriez; B. Soenens; D. Hutsebaut, Introducing the shortened Post- 
Critical Belief Scale, in: Personality and Individual Differences 38 (2005) 851-857. Hutsebaut is largely de­
pendent on Wulff.
94 Although in 1996 Hutsebaut stressed that orthodoxy should not be identified with fundamentalism, as it is 
open to questions and to a certain degree of symbolic interpretation (Post-Critical Belief, 56-57), in 2001 this 
approach is described as fundamentalist. See B. Duriez; D, Hutsebaut, Approaches to Religion and the Moods 
and Emotions Associated with Religion. An Exploratory Study in Flandres (Belgium), in: Journal of Empirical 
Theology 14.2 (2001) 75-84 (76-77). Actually this interpretation was characterised by Wulff himself as proper 
to fundamentalism.
95 Hutsebaut, Post-Critical Belief, 57-58.
96 Duriez; Hutsebaut, Approaches, 76.
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single way of expressing truth. Applying Ricoeur’s interpretation of symbols and his her­
meneutics shows that the antagonism between faith and natural science, between faith 
and reason occurs in the case of literal affirmation (orthodoxy/fundamentalism), or of lit­
eral disaffirmation (external critique). This opposition is removed in the case of restora­
tive-symbolic interpretation of the text, leading to a second naïveté.
Conclusions
In Christian circles, claiming a conflict between the biblical and the scientific explanation 
concerning the origin of the world and of humans has to do with specific hermeneutical 
options, namely biblical literalism, strict inerrantism and a naive interpretation of inspira­
tion. Recognising the (real)symbolic character of religious language eliminates this diffi­
culty, and reveals the deeper meaning of the text.
Although postmodern, synchronic, literary or canonical readings declared the end of 
historical criticism, knowledge of the ‘Sitz im Leben’, of the genre, of the cultural, his­
torical and religious context of the author and of the authorial intention are essential for 
understanding biblical texts. Otherwise the meaning of the text becomes entirely subjec­
tive. This should be maintained even when historical criticism is not the one and only 
path to discovering the meaning of the text. More important for our topic, awareness of 
these issues prevents the interpreter from reading into the text modem questions, includ­
ing scientific matters.
Beyond issues of biblical hermeneutics, there is broader question that needs to be con­
sidered, concerning our presuppositions about the cognition of reality. Biblical funda­
mentalists and ideologically oriented natural scientists share in a sense an epistemological 
monism, according to which reality may be appropriately described using one single ap­
proach (bible or science). However, reality is far more complex to be accurately de­
scribed by a single mode of cognition, let this be that of natural science or religion. 
Whereas these approaches have distinct principles and methods, they should not be re­
garded as mutually exclusive or, at best, parallel. Examples of fruitful dialogue between 
religion and science strengthen this perspective.
Der Beitrag befasst sich mit den christlichen Wurzeln der Auseinandersetzung zwi­
schen der Evolutionstheorie und biblischen Sichtweisen der Schöpfung. Der von ei­
nigen Theologen geltend gemachte Gegensatz hängt mit hermeneutischen Ent­
scheidungen und theologischen Auffassungen zusammen, wie etwa der Annahme 
einer vollständigen Yerbalinspiration und der absoluten Irrtumslosigkeit der Bibel. 
Zunächst werden die Versuche behandelt, den Konflikt zwischen den Schöpfungs­
berichten und der Evolutionstheorie zu lösen oder zu überwinden. Nach einer Kritik 
an der Verbalinspiration wird die Relevanz der historisch-kritischen Methode heraus­
gestellt. Ricceur folgend wird schließlich dargelegt, inwiefern bei der Interpretation 
biblischer Texte der symbolische Charakter religiöser Sprache beachtet werden muss.
